Speech by Federal Minister of Defence Boris Pistorius at the conference jointly hosted by the Federal Ministry of Defence, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung on “The Comprehensive Approach to Security in the Sahel”.
Martin Schulz,
Svenja Schulze,
Members of parliament,
Excellencies,
Ladies and gentlemen,
During my first year in office, I travelled to the Sahel twice. On my first visit together with you, Svenja, I travelled to Niger and Mali before visiting Niger again in December.
On both trips it was important to me to have an exchange with the local people – with those in power, but also with those representing civil society.
I took away several messages from these conversations that I will happily put up for discussion here at this forum – a forum at which we not only want to talk about Africa and the Sahel, but talk with representatives from the continent and the region.
- One: People in the Sahel want security and stability as the prerequisite for a life in dignity with material security. Violent criminal, extremist and terrorist organisations challenge this security and stability on a daily basis.
- Two: Democracy is the preferred form of government – this is also true for the people of the Sahel. Yet the experiences they have had so far in their – purported – democracies are not all positive. Many people have experienced instances of corruption and illicit enrichment on the part of political parties or clans.
- Three: Black-and-white thinking is not helpful. The African continent cannot be split into democracies on the one hand and autocracies on the other. Rather, we are facing many shades of grey. Good or bad governance seems to be a key touchstone for the people: which government meets my needs for security, social prospects and participation – and which one does not?
- Four: The people in the Sahel want to lead self-determined lives, in both minor and major matters. They do not want to be told by others what rules and principles they should abide by in governing or managing their country. They strongly aspire to national sovereignty, not least as a result of their collective experience under colonial rule.
- Five: International support is welcome, both in the economic domain and in matters of national security. Such support, however, must always respect the country’s national sovereignty. It is not about placing executive authority into the hands of foreign troops or advisers. Rather, international assistance should enable and enhance, so that African nations and the countries in the Sahel can take destiny into their own hands.
- Six: Germany continues to be a welcome partner, because we respect sovereignty and focus our engagement on enabling and enhancing at the local level. We thereby help people to help themselves. We are equally appreciated as a partner by those in power and by civil society. Even those forces that are critical towards the military governments have asked me to keep up our military support.
I heard these messages, loud and clear, both in Mali and Niger. And I think these findings give us something to work with, because they correspond to our own interests:
- We, too, have a vital interest in a Sahel region that is stable and prosperous.
- We, too, want to prevent terrorist organisations from gaining a foothold there, from bullying the population or controlling territory.
- We, too, want people to live in dignified and secure conditions that give them no reason to leave their home with their sights set on Europe.
And, naturally, we maintain that democratic systems that allow people to participate in political life and where governments are controlled by parliament and free media will, in the medium and long term, lead to better governance than any autocratic regime can offer.
But this should not come to mean that we stipulate democratic conditions as a prerequisite of our engagement. Instead, our efforts to further security and stability and to boost economic development should contribute to decent living conditions and, in the medium term, help social participation and political ownership to prevail.
What does that mean for our commitment? Again, I would like to summarise this in six points:
- One: We have to design our commitment in a strategic manner, which means: no knee-jerk reactions, no back and forth, but having a policy for the long haul. Sure, we do not always agree with who is ruling the country and they may not always meet our standards in terms of legitimacy. We must address serious violations of human rights in a frank and open manner. But this should not knock us off our strategic political course. Once bridges have been burnt, their reconstruction becomes arduous work.
- Two: We want to cooperate in a multilateral framework: in recent decades and in the context of the Sahel, this meant the European Union and the United Nations. When this framework is no longer given, and that is the situation right now, we have to get engaged bilaterally, too. In close consultation with other nations who are also continuing their commitment. And in the knowledge that by doing so, we are building a bridge for a time when international organisations will gain traction once more.
So that we can use our bilateral channels, for example to enable staff from the EUEuropean Union police mission EUCAPEU Capacity Building Mission Sahel to safely leave Niger. I am glad that this was successfully achieved last weekend. - Three: Over many decades, we have established an impressive toolbox of bilateral military assistance, ranging from training assistance and equipment aid – which includes the dispatch of advisory groups – to capacity building, mobile training teams, bilateral annual programmes, and the deployment of military advisers to participating defence ministries.
These tools are very well received in the beneficiary countries – which becomes clear to me every time we have to terminate a programme for lack of capacities or simply because the original task has been fulfilled, and the country concerned makes every effort to ensure its continuation.
I would therefore like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the many servicemen and servicewomen and other experts who have been fulfilling these advisory tasks for decades with great professionalism and motivation.
Because of the success of these instruments, however, we must also expand our capacities. We must not turn down countries that want to cooperate with us as equal partners, that fulfil all necessary requirements and whose support benefits our own security interests – even if that means we have to invest more money. The rule that we can only exert influence where we continue to be actively involved and present applies here as well. This influence also aims at good governance and democratic development. - Four: African Ownership. Or, to use the words of the famous Ghanaian economist George Ayittey: African solutions to African problems! What I mean by that is, firstly, that our measures are always primarily intended to support sovereign states in the region. Secondly, our objective is also to enable Africa to take collective action if the deployment of external stabilisation forces should become necessary in times of crisis.
This is why Germany and the European Union support the African Union and ECOWASEconomic Community of West African States – as institutions, but also in the form of capacity building for their members states’ standby forces – for example in Ghana, Benin or Senegal. Increasing multilateralism will definitely help the African continent to better make its voice heard on the international stage. - Five: I cannot stand next to my colleague Svenja Schulze without addressing the comprehensive approach. However, it is also my firm belief that we cannot have isolated military solutions to challenges, especially not in the Sahel region. If you want to get down to the roots of crime, extremism and terrorism and eliminate their breeding ground, you must improve the socio-economic situation of the people. This is a broad field of activity for development cooperation – and at the same time for military assistance. For economic measures are frequently not effective if the environment is not safe. In other words, providing economic assistance and building up an effective security sector are often two sides of the same coin and must therefore be addressed together.
And this comprehensive approach is exactly what gives our policies the necessary weight. - Six: Russia has significantly consolidated its position in the Sahel region in recent years. I will spare you a detailed analysis of how this came about. I am far more interested in what that means for the people who live there. The sobering truth is that wherever Russian troops are deployed, the security situation is deteriorating considerably. For one thing, this is due to the fact that Russia usually does little to protect civilians in its fight against terrorism – and is creating more and more martyrs this way. For another thing, given its lack of development policy instruments, Russia does not follow a comprehensive approach that would consider the root causes of terrorism in the first place.
Which is why I don’t see any competition between us and Russia in the Sahel region. But I do see the danger of practically driving these states into Russia’s arms by automatically suspending our entire cooperation with them in response to unconstitutional regime changes. The people in these countries do not deserve this.
At the same time, it runs counter to the interest we have in sustainable security and stability in the Sahel. It means leaving the field in Africa to an autocratic power that is fighting an illegal war of aggression against its neighbour in the heart of Europe. This cannot be what we want to achieve. Which makes it all the more important that we act strategically in terms of our engagement in the Sahel region, and that we are patient – regardless of the uncertainties that invariably come with this engagement.
I want to pursue an approach for that region that is both strategic and comprehensive – an approach that is not just accepted by the people in the region, but which they are actively involved in. We need relations on an equal footing – without losing sight of our own interests, values and principles.
The situation in the Sahel is constantly changing. What does not change is the interests of the local people, our own interests in the region, and, most importantly, our common interest in security and stability.
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